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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS CITIZEN 
SUIT STATUTE 
By Gregor I. McGregor-:-
1. INTRODUCTION 
Those who oppose vesting in the private citizen a power of law 
enforcement to protect the environment may argue that such a 
citizen-right-of-action will flood the courts, harass industry, trade 
administrative discretion for judicial fiat, create patchwork stan-
dards for environmental quality, and require complex decisions 
from incompetent courts. They may also argue that a provision 
for citizen suit in Massachusetts is simply not needed. 
Proponents may counter that the courts themselves control the 
floodgates, that environmentalists are entitled to their day in 
court, that a citizen-right-of-action does not displace but instead 
supplements agency enforcement, that pollution control is an 
area not conducive to predetermined codes and standards, and 
that courts are at their best when called upon to settle disputes 
of fundamental policy. They may further assert that society is in 
no position to refuse environmental enforcement assistance from 
whatever source. 
Effective September 7, 1971, citizens and political subdivisions 
of Massachusetts possess a new cause of action against damage 
to the environment, a right to enforce state and local environ-
mental law. On that day, Chapter 732 of the Acts of 1971 was 
enacted, made effective immediately by an emergency preamble. 
I t is, of course, impossible to foresee the specific environmental 
benefits which will accrue from the new statute. Nevertheless, 
it is appropriate at this time to examine the most important 
changes effected by the citizen suit statute and the tactical con-
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siderations which will be of interest to those who sue or are sued 
thereunder. The parallel ci tizen-righ t-of-in terven tion will also be 
considered briefly. Where helpful, comparison will be made with 
the first citizen suit statute, enacted in Michigan (effective 
October 1, 1970) and with others enacted thereafter in Minnesota 
(approved June 7, 1971) and Indiana (effective September 2, 
1971); comparison will also be made with parts of the federal 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (effective January 1, 1971). For 
convenience the new Massachusetts statute is printed as an 
appendix to this article and the other acts are cited here for 
reference: Act 127 P.A.1970, Mich. Compo Ann. §§691-1201-
1207, also found at 1 ELR 43001-43002; M.S.A. 116B.01-.14, 
Ch. 952 of Minn. Session Laws; Indiana Public Law 182 (I.C. 
13-6); federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857 et seq., as amended 
through 1970 by PL 91-604, which added sec. 304, found at 1 
ELR 41224-41225. 
II. THE CHANGES EFFECTED 
A. The General Provisions 
Chapter 732 of the Acts of 1971 amends Chapter 214 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws, dealing with equity jurisdiction 
and procedure, by inserting section lOA. That section gives to 
any ten persons domiciled in Massachusetts and to any political 
subdivision of the Commonwealth standing to sue in equity for 
declaratory or equitable remedies against damage, actual or 
probable, to the natural resources of Massachusetts. The right to 
sue is conditioned on the ground that the environmental damage 
which is caused or threatened be a violation of a statute, ordi-
nance, by-law or regulation whose major purpose is to prevent or 
minimize such damage. Preliminary injunctive relief, including a 
temporary restraining order, may issue if irreparable damage will 
otherwise result. 
No action under the statute may be commenced unless twenty-
one days prior to such commencemen t wri tten notice has been 
directed by certified mail to the Attorney General, the respon-
dent, and the agency charged with enforcing any applicable 
statute, ordinance, by-law or regulation. An exception to this 
requirement of notice is provided where a temporary restraining 
order is justified. A defense is expressly available to any respon-
dent who is in good faith compliance with an administrative 
pollution abatement schedule or implementation plan, if such a 
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schedule or plan has as its purpose the alleviation of the environ-
mental damage complained of. An exception to such a defense 
arises when there is a danger to the public health and safety. 
Successful petitioners may be permitted reimbursement for 
their costs, including reasonable fees for expert witnesses. At-
torney's fees, however, are expressly precluded, as are damages 
generally. The court may require a surety or cash bond of peti-
tioners in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars in order 
to secure costs to the respondent should he prevail. 
The statute provides that any citizen suit shall be advanced for 
speedy trial. None may be compromised without prior court 
approval. Finally, the cause of action is expressly made supple-
mental to all other common law or statutory rights and remedies. 
B. The Right oj Action 
The Massachusetts citizen suit statute is expressly directed at 
"any destruction, damage, or impairment, actual or probable, to 
any of the natural resources of the commonwealth." Petitioners 
need not show causal harm to themselves or to any other persons 
by virtue of such environmental damage. No weighing of the 
commercial or other usefulness of natural resources is required. 
This destruction, damage or impairment of natural resources 
would per se be actionable except that the Legislature included 
an express proviso that the Superior Court have jurisdiction 
only over environmental damage which is violative of an environ-
mental statute, ordinance, by-law, or regulation. Unlike those of 
Michigan, Minnesota and Indiana, the Massachusetts citizen 
suit statute authorizes private enforcement only of legislative 
enactments and administrative regulations. The statute expands 
in startling fashion the class of possible petitioners so as to include 
private citizens and political subdivisions, but the statute does 
not add any substantive protection for natural recourses. 
C. Standing and Related Matters 
The Massachusetts statute has no requirement of damage to 
any petitioner or any other person. Standing is conferred upon 
any ten persons who are domiciled in :Massachusetts. By com-
parison, Michigan, Minnesota, Indiana and the Clean Air Act 
confer standing on anyone resident. As do the other states, 
l\:1assachusetts confers standing also upon any political subdivi-
SIon. 
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"Person" under the statute is left undefined, although earlier 
pieces of citizen suit legislation, from which St. 1971, c. 732 was 
derived, used the term broadly to include any group organized 
under Massachusetts law, any public authority or state or local 
agency, department, body or official, any association, partner-
ship, corporation, company or business organization, the Com-
monwealth, any group of individuals, any joint stock company, 
trust, estate, public or quasi-public corporation or body, and 
any other legal entity or legal representative, agent or assign. 
See, variously, Senate No. 637, House No. 5023, House No. 
5233, Senate No. 1415; see also Senate Nos. 749 and 800, and 
House Nos. 438,1176,1177, and 1576. 
Since no definition of "person" was included in the citizen suit 
statute as enacted, a definition must be gleaned from other 
statutes and cases. Mass. G.L. c. 4, §7, provides that absent a 
contrary intent the word "person" in a statute shall include 
corporations, societies, associations, and partnerships. By its 
terms this definition is not exclusive, but the Massachusetts 
cases are singularly unhelpful in supplying information regarding 
what other entities fall under the rubric "persons." By and large, 
the court decisions are limi ted to interpreting the word in narrow 
statutory circumstances. E.g., Attorney General v. City oj Woburn, 
322 Mass. 634, 637 (1948) (sewers); City oj Somerville v. Common-
wealth, 313 Mass. 482, 486 (1943) (public relief); China Clipper 
Ship Restaurant,Inc. v. Yue 'Joe, 312 Mass. 540, 542 (1942) (trade 
regulation); Mary Madden v. City oj Springfield, 131 Mass. 441, 
442 (1881) (highways). 
"Domicil" under the Massachusetts statute is, like "person," 
left undefined. Although the law of domicil may differ for differ-
ent purposes, such as voting and taxation, it would appear that 
the Massachusetts Legislature intended to apply the general 
rule of domicil to the citizen suit statute. According to Mas-
sachusetts common law, 
"what the law means by domicil is the one technically pre-eminent 
headquarters, which, as a result either of fact or of fiction, every 
person is compelled to have in order that by aid of it certain rights 
and duties which have been attached to it by the law may be de-
termined." Bergner and Engel Brewing u. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154, 
157 (1898). 
Chief Justice Rugg of the Supreme Judicial Court elaborated 
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upon the Massachusetts law of domicil as developed In cases 
subsequent to Dreyfus: 
The ascertainment of the domicil of a person is mainly a question of 
fact .... General principles governing the nature, acquisition and 
change of domicil are settled. An exact and comprehensive definition 
of domicil is difficult. In general it is said to be the place of one's 
actual residence with intention to remain permanently or for an in-
definite time and without any certain purpose to return to a former 
place of abode. Everyone must have a domicil somewhere. Every 
one has a domicil of origin. A domicil once established continues un-
til a new one is acquired regardless of changes in temporary sojourn. 
Mere absences from home even for somewhat prolonged periods do 
not work a change of domicil. Intention without the concurrence of 
the fact of residence is not sufficient to change or to create domicil. 
Both must coexist. Aspiration, hope, desire or mere verbal assertion, 
although evidence of intention, cannot overcome the force of ir-
refutable facts. Cases arise in which there is a distinction between 
domicil and residence. A person may have a residence in one place for 
various reasons comparatively temporary in nature such as per-
forming the duties of an office, transacting a business, seeking im-
provement in health, pursuing pleasure or visiting relatives, and yet 
have his permanent home or domicil in a different place. Tuells u. 
Flint, 283 Mass. 106, 109 (1933). 
"Political subdivision of the commonwealth" under the Mas-
sachusetts citizen suit statute may be taken to mean at least a 
city, town, county or district of Massachusetts, but the phrase 
suffers from a dearth of statutory and judicial treatment. Such 
treatment as there is suggests that a "political subdivision" 
under Massachusetts law is any public unit of more or less geo-
graphical nature. E.g., Mass. G.L. c. 32B, §2 (group insurance) 
and c.32, §1 (retirement systems); see also Boston EI.Ry.Co. v. 
Welch, 25 F.Supp. 809, 810 (1939). It is important to note, in 
addition, that under the new citizen suit statute, any political 
subdivision has standing to sue alone, without the need to join 
with nine other petitioners. This right of enforcement in cities, 
towns, counties and other political subdivisions will do much to 
improve their position vis-a-vis polluters against whom the only 
remedies previously available were local ordinances and by-laws, 
common law nuisance, trespass and negligence, and certain lim-
ited statutory redresses. An example of such an improved position 
occurs with respect to the inland wetlands protection statute, 
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Mass. G.L. c. 131, §40, whereunder the rights of municipalities 
will no longer be restricted to securing access to development 
plans and making recommedations to the state Department of 
Natural Resources; the city or town may now enforce the wet-
lands statute itself. Similarly, municipal agencies, such as police 
and fire departments and boards of health, need no longer rely 
soley upon approval of the state Department of Public Health 
for authority to enforce state air pollution regulations (see Mass. 
G.L. c. 111, §142B); the city or town may now enforce air pollu-
tion statutes and regulations in its own right. 
D. News for Polluters 
Prospective respondents should recognize that liability is joint 
and several. This provision therefore alleviates a traditional 
difficulty which has confronted the petitioner suing a polluter 
whose discharge may have been small, not measurable with cer-
tainty, or not traceable to any but a collective of air or water 
polluters. Of note, however, is the express exclusion from the 
definition of "damages to the environment" of such destruction, 
damage or impairment as is "insignificant". The exclusion sug-
gests that a requisite semblance of measurability, if not causal 
certain ty, is retained. 
Also of note is that one is subject to suit and to the equitable 
powers of the court not only for actual effects but also for merely 
"probable" destruction, damage or impairment of natural re-
sources. While this may be understood to reach more than merely 
possible results, some further guidance is provided by Cotters Case, 
333 Mass. 28, 31 (1955) where the Supreme Judicial Court as-
serted that "the lexical meaning of the word 'probably' is 'in all 
likelihood.' " One lexicon, Black's Law Dictionary, also suggests 
that what is probable has the appearance of truth or foundation 
in reason or experience, or has "more evidence for than against." 
Black's, Rev. 4th ed., West Pub. Co. (1968). 
Lastly, but very importantly, it appears that the Common-
wealth, its agencies and its political subdivisions may be im-
mune from citizen suit under the Massachusetts statute. Al-
though the term "respondent" in the initial paragraph is not 
further clarified, the court's jurisdiction and remedies in the 
second paragraph are limited to persons. Specific statutory ex-
ceptions can be found (e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, Mass. 
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G.L.c.30A §1 (4)), but under Massachusetts common law "[t]he 
word 'person' is not apt to describe a municipality." Howard v. 
City of Chicopee, 299 Mass. 115, 121 (1937). As to other political 
subdivisions it should be noted that the Legislature indicated 
its intent to differentiate between persons and political subdivi-
sions in establishing standing to sue under the citizen suit statute. 
Absent mention of political subdivisions in providing for liability 
to suit, it could be maintained that the Legislature chose to 
exclude political subdivisions as potential respondents. Absent 
inclusion of the Commonwealth as respondent, it could be main-
tained that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity. At least 
one bill has been filed to close these statutory gaps (House No. 
4064 of 1971). Even if such a bill does not pass, at least one argu-
ment could help to close them: since the Legislature chose to 
provide for effective private enforcement of environmental law, 
the Legislature intended that the statute, ordinance, bylaw or 
regulation in question determine the scope of possible respondents. 
E. The Standard for Preliminary Relief 
Under the citizen suit statute the court having jurisdiction 
may prior to a trial on the merits restrain actual or threatened 
damage to the environment. The standard for such preliminary 
relief is left unspecified but for a showing of "irreparable dam-
agel' which will justify the court's waiving the twenty-one day 
notice requirement and issuing a temporary restraining order. 
This standard of "irreparable damage" theoretically differs 
from the usual requisites for a temporary restraining order is-
sued ex parte. Mass. G.L. c. 214, §9 declares that loss or damage 
must be not only irreparable but also "immediate." Such dis-
parity in standards may prove to have little practical effect, but 
it is interesting to observe that the requisite showing for a tem-
porary restraining order is significantly eased if no proof of 
immediate environmental harm need be adduced. Proof of the 
irreparable nature of environmental insult would seem the lighter 
burden. 
F. The Citizen Right of Intervention 
Broad public access to state decision-making is provided by 
section 2 of the Massachusetts citizen suit statute. In state ad-
ministrative hearings, alleged polluters are for the first time held 
accountable for their damage, the nature and extent of environ-
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mental injury is for the first time factually adjudicated, and ne-
gotiation begins over abatement schedules. Citizen intervention 
at this stage could have a more profound effect upon Massachu-
setts pollution control than even the main subject of the new 
statute, the citizen right to sue. 
The state Administrative Procedure Act, Mass. G.L. c. 30A, 
is amended by inserting section lOA. Any ten persons are given 
the right to intervene in any state adjudicatory proceeding in 
which damage to the environment is or might be at issue. Such 
intervention is limited to that issue and to the elimination or 
reduction of the damage. With limited exception, any intervener 
may introduce testimonial and other evidence and may make 
written or oral argument. The status of party is conferred on 
each intervener in order to secure the benefits of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, including the right of judicial review under 
section 14. 
Several aspects warrant special note. First, there is no restric-
tion on domicile or residence of the ten interveners. Second, inter-
vention is conditioned not upon a showing that the proceeding 
will have a substantial and specific effect upon the interveners, 
as under existing law, but upon a showing merely that damage to 
the environment is or might be at issue. CJ. Mass. G.L. c. 30A, 
§10(4). Third, once the requisite showing is made, intervention 
is not left to the discretion of the agency as in §10(4), but is in-
stead mandatory. Lastly, the citizen intervention provision 
mandates that any decision in such a proceeding include the dis-
position of the environmental damage issue. This would appear to 
establish a cause of action enforceable by petition for a writ of 
mandamus or petition for judicial review through §14(8) (c), (d). 
It furthermore appears that intervention is not limited to pro-
ceedings before what might be termed pollution agencies. Inter-
vention into any proceedings is permitted; there is no require-
ment that the environmental damage in question be violative of 
a statute, ordinance by-law or regulation. The broad definition 
of "damage to the environment" is adopted from the citizen suit 
section of the statute, but whereas the citizen cause of action is 
conditioned upon statutory or other regulatory violation, the 
citizen right of intervention is not. Intervention thus may prove a 
powerful tool for citizens to assure proper cognizance by all 
agencies of the environmental consequences of agency action. 
Also significant is the array of administrative benefits which 
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accrue to each intervener. Among the rights at the time of agency 
hearing are entitlement to receive reasonable notice of time and 
place and of the issues involved (Mass. G.L. c. 30A §11(1)), to 
issue subpoenas in the name of the agency (§12(3)), to adduce 
testimonial and other evidence (§11(3)), to receive a decision 
based on the evidence presented (§ 11 (4) ), to receive notice of 
material judicially noticed (§l1(S)), to obtain an official record 
of the proceedings-verbatim if requested and paid for (§11(6)), 
and to receive a decision accompanied by reasons and the neces-
sary determinations of law and fact (§11(8)). Among the obli-
gations of each intervener is the duty to properly make an ap-
pearance following receipt of notice of the proceeding (Mass. 
G.L. c. 30A, §1(3) (b)) and to adduce "evidence on which reason-
able persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious 
affairs" (§11 (2)). On this point of evidence it should be noted that 
under Massachusetts administrative law agency decisions need 
be founded only upon "substantial evidence," not upon the pre-
ponderance of the evidence (§§1(6) and 14(8) (e)). 
The grounds for judicial review are stated in Mass. G.L. c. 30A, 
§14(8). Review itself may not be sought later than thirty days 
from receipt of notice of the final decision of the agency (§14(1)), 
and intervention of right in a judicial review proceeding already 
pending in Superior Court is available only to those who were 
parties to the agency proceeding under review (§14(2)). This il-
lustrates the advisability for conservation organizations and 
other groups to acquaint themselves early with the agency regu-
lation-making process so important to later enforcement pro-
ceedings and judicial review. Requests for notice of all public 
hearings involved in the promulgation of regulations may be filed 
in advance pursuant to Mass. G.L. c. 30A, §§2(1)(b) and 3(1) 
(b). 
Some limitations on the citizen right of intervention should be 
noted. First, the right is to intervene in, not to initiate, agency 
proceedings. Second, the right is to intervene only in an "ad-
judicatory proceeding" before an "agency" as defined in Mass. 
G.L. c. 30A, §1 (1) and (2). Therefore participation is possible 
only in so called "fair hearings" before state agencies. Lastly, 
perhaps indicative of litigation to come, the right to intervene is 
limited to persons. No mention is made of political subdivisions 
such as cities and towns, and, as pointed out above, "persons" 
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is not under Massachusetts law taken to refer to political sub-
divisions. Supra, part II(D). It might be argued, however, that 
the Administrative Procedure Act's definition of "person" 
should obtain: for the purposes of Mass. G.L. c. 30A, the word 
person "includes all political subdivisions of the commonwealth" 
(§1(4». This line of reasoning would generate the interesting 
result, however, that not just one but ten political subdivisions 
would be necessary for intervention under the new statute. Under 
the present chapter 30A perhaps the existing standards for inter-
ven tion by a city or town presen t less difficulty (§ 10 (4». 
III. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Desired Results at the Lowest Cost 
Environmental civil enforcement litigation may serve a wealth 
of purposes. Among them, court action will prod the uncoopera-
tive polluter, enlighten the well-meaning but ignorant polluter, 
and punish the polluter who operates in bad faith. Litigation 
provides a forum for the thoughtful resolution of some of the 
more complex problems raised by a technological society and is 
an avenue to the ultimate goal of prevention or abatement of 
environmental injury. 
This ultimate goal should be more easily achieved by way of the 
Massachusetts citizen suit statute. The petitioner will have access 
to traditional equitable remedies, including affirmative and 
negative injunctive relief (both temporary and permanent) 
which is enforceable by means of a contempt petition. The statute 
also provides for the declaratory relief which is available under 
Mass. G.L. c. 231A. An indirect but no less tangible result might 
be the spurring of the reluctant state or local administrative 
agency to take action, since simply filing a citizen suit will open 
up administrative enforcement to scrutiny. The new Massachu-
setts statute will not, however, serve as a substitute for a classic 
mandamus action against an inactive agency, since the new cause 
of action is directed only at persons who cause or threaten en-
vironmental damage and who in so doing violate law. 
Both these traditional and less direct results maybe achieved 
at a considerable saving in expense over other litigation. Bond 
or surety is discretionary with the court and costs are expressly 
recoverable, including reasonable fees for expert witnesses. On 
this point, under Massachusetts law, 
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"[t]he word 'costs' in connection with proceedings in courts imports 
an allowance to a party by way of either penalty against a defendant 
party or indemnity to a victor. It is an incident of litigation. So far 
as awarded to the successful party, costs are designed to mitigate to 
a greater or less extent the necessary expenses incurred in the conduct 
of litigation." (Emphasis added.) Boynton v. Tarbell, 272 Mass.142, 
~44 (1930) 
The recognition by the citizen suit statute of expert witness fees 
as a necessary expense in conducting environmental litigation is 
commendable, but it should be noted that the statute narrows 
the allowance of costs from their mandatory assessment called 
for by Mass. G.L. c. 261, §1. Furthermore, reimbursement under 
the statute will follow the traditional distinction between costs 
and expenses, and the latter will be disallowed. Mealey v. Fegan, 
274 Mass., 599, 601 (1931). 
The provision for twenty-one days written notice under the 
citizen suit statutes acts to postpone the filing of a bill of com-
plaint, except when a temporary restraining order is warranted. 
This requisite delay is soundly based, for it prevents crowding 
of the docket and unnecessary use of the court but still provides 
an incentive to respondent or agency to initiate corrective action. 
It may be expected that mere service of the requisite twenty-one 
day notice may often achieve the results of litigation and thereby 
render litigation unnecessary. The costs would be minimal and no 
attorney's appearance would be required. In some cases, no 
doubt, petitioners may find it advantageous to postpone the 
filing of a bill of complaint beyond the minimum period of delay 
since, rights preserved, no advantage is lost. It should be recog-
nized that the requisite notice should be sent to each one of the 
local and state agencies with any jurisdiction over the environ-
mental offenses complained of. 
Special administrative remedies may be developed as a result 
of litigation under the act. Unlike the Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Indiana statutes, the Massachusetts statute does not expressly 
provide for referral or remand to administrative agencies for 
disposition of a case, but a petitioner or respondent or both may 
request administrative disposition, perhaps with the court re-
taining jurisdiction in order to later review the agency decision 
or to rely on its determination of the facts. For other cases the 
appointment of a master may best ease the court's burden while 
meeting the litigant's needs. In either event, if agency referral 
CITIZEN SUITS 617 
or remand or use of a master does not merely protract the litiga-
tion, the principal goal of pollution prevention or abatement may 
be reached at a minimum of cost. The ultimate danger is that such 
use of agency time will cause a relaxation of existing agency 
monitoring efforts and will jeopardize present pollution enforce-
ment measures carried out on the basis of carefully planned 
policies and priori ties. 
B. Selection of Petitioners 
By the terms of the citizen suit statute the remedies conferred 
do not replace existing common law and statutory relief. Any 
insurmountable difficulties met in bringing a citizen suit, includ-
ing location of proper petitioners, would dictate either recourse 
to traditional doctrines of nuisance, negligence and trespass, or 
perhaps seeking permission of the Attorney General to commence 
a public trust action. Within the confines of the citizen suit 
statute, though, the petitioner who is unsuccessful at recruiting 
nine others might successfully implore a municipality or other 
political subdivision to commence an action, as no minimum 
number of parties would then be needed. The prospects of joining 
as petitioner the state or local agency charged with enforcing the 
applicable law should also be considered. 
As to the selection of individual petitioners, fairness to respon-
dents and the importance of success would dictate the selection 
of more than the ten minimum required, with careful attention to 
domicil and to the need for petitioners who sue in good faith 
and in full knowledge of and agreement with the purposes and 
nature of the proceeding. 
C. Defenses 
Good faith compliance with an administrative "implementa-
tion plan" or "abatement schedule" may prove but one of many 
affirmative defenses raised against Massachusetts citizen suits. 
None are precluded by the statute, and the Michigan, Minnesota, 
and Indiana acts suggest that a respondent in equity might suc-
cessfully show that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to 
damage to the environment or that his conduct is consistent with 
promotion of the public health, safety, or welfare. Importantly, 
the defense specified in the Massachusetts statute will be of little 
present value except in water pollution cases since only the Divi-
sion of Water Pollution Control in the Department of Natural 
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Resources employs abatement schedules in aid of state pollution 
enforcemen t. 
When employed, however, the defense of good faith compliance 
will place considerable pressure on state and local agencies. Both 
petitioner and respondent will seek the favors of the agency in 
advance of litigation and each may seek to subpoena agency 
officials during the progress of litigation. While the prospective 
petitioner will seek to learn the existence of outstanding agency 
plans or schedules and the status of compliance therewith, the 
prospective respondent will seek to confirm compliance or seek 
to moot a prospective case by creation or amendment of an abate-
ment schedule. These pressures can be expected to continue 
during litigation, and the testimony of agency officials may be 
crucial to resolution of an affirmative defense. It would appear 
advisable for all parties to approach appropriate agencies, if at 
all, long before litigation commences and for the prospective 
respondent to appear with proposed abatement schedule in hand. 
The defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata will aid in 
preventing a multiplicity of lawsuits, as may be threatened 
against a large industry, but these tactics, however, also point up 
the need for aggrieved parties to coordinate their litigation and to 
avoid the pitfalls of inadequate publicity of actions and poor 
prosecution of early cases. Consolidation of cases may be another 
defensive tactic which will at least minimize a respondent's 
exposure to the risks of assessed costs, (Mass. G.L. c. 261, §8) 
but consolidation can also redound to petitioners' benefit. Burke 
v. Hodge, 211 Mass. 156, 158-59 (1912); Lumiansky v. Tessier, 
213 Mass. 182, 189 (1912); see 9 Mass. Prac. (Mottla), c. 27, 
§§673, 674. 
D. The Breadth of the Statute 
If the proper case presents itself the argument might be at-
tempted that the Massachusetts citizen suit statute makes 
damage to the enviroment per se actionable, with no requirement 
that the damage be as well a violation of any statute, ordinance, 
by-law or regulation. The argument is founded upon the statute's 
structure. 
Although the first paragraph of the statute serves but a de-
finitional purpose, the definition of "damage to the environment" 
is extended to any of the natural resources of the Commonwealth 
and expressly includes items not covered by any comprehensive 
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state scheme of statutory or other regulation, such as noise and 
"open spaces" and "natural areas." Certain earlier versions of the 
Massachusetts citizen suit legislation expressly limited "damage 
to the environment" to statutory or regulatory violations, a 
limitation not retained in House No. 5916 of 1971 as enacted as 
St. 1971, c. 732 (e.g., see Senate No. 637 and House No. 438). 
Moreover, other earlier versions of citizen suit legislation un-
equivocably limited the new cause of action to enforcement of 
statutes, ordinances and regulations (House No. 5023, House 
No. 5233, and Senate No. 1415; see also Senate No. 800 and 
House No. 1176). Such clear limitation, appearing in Senate No. 
1415 as passed by the Massachusetts Senate and sent to the 
House on May 5, 1971 (Senate Journal 1208), was conspicuously 
absent from the response by the House: House No. 5916 was 
reported out of the Committee on Third Reading and was sub-
stituted for the Senate bill on July 13, 1971 (House Journal 
2066-2067). The proviso of statutory or other violation in this 
substituted bill, passed by both House and Senate substantially 
in its original form, arguably conditions only the granting of 
preliminary injunctive relief, not the entire cause of action. 
This argument is contingent on either disregarding the semi-
colon in the second paragraph of the statute or applying the pro-
viso clause to only the next preceding clause, both of which may 
be permitted by canons of statutory interpretation. Dowling v. 
Board oj Assessors of Boston, 268 Mass. 480,488 (1929); Attorney 
General v. City oj Methuen, 236 Mass. 564,573 (1921). Therefore, 
the paragraph would be read in two parts, each authorizing dis-
tinct court action. First, the court "may" entertain in equity, 
the issue of damage to the environment; second, the court "may, ' 
before final determination, grant restraining relief as to environ-
mental damage which constitutes a statutory or regulatory 
violation. Such a limitation upon preliminary relief would make 
eminently good sense if the cause of action does indeed extend 
even to environmental damage which results from conduct 
which is in conformance with all applicable law. 
It could be further maintained that the spirit of the statute is 
directed at damage to the environment, not violations of law, 
since some stress is laid, for purposes of preliminary relief and 
court retention of jurisdiction, on "irreparable damage" and 
"danger to the public health and safety." Arguably, the Legisla-
ture could not have intended to frustrate so broad a purpose by 
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confining the cause of action to the strictures of existing statutory 
and regulatory enforcement. As a final note, it is observed that 
not only the structure but also the title of Senate No. 1415 was 
altered, as discussed above, by the substituted House No. 5916. 
An act "to secure a Right of Action to Enforce Statutes and Regu-
lations Protecting the Natural Resources of the Commonwealth" 
became one "Establishing a Cause of Action for Certain Persons 
[and "Political Subdivisions," added by the Senate, Senate Jour-
nal 1873] For the Purpose of Protecting the Natural Resources 
and Environment of tile Commonwealth." It is the law in Mas-
sachusetts that the title is in a legal sense a part of every statute 
and may be considered in construing the statute. The title cannot 
extend or restrict the scope of an act if already manifested by 
unambiguous language in the body of the statute, but the Mas-
sachusetts citizen suit statute may present a case where, as in 
earlier cases, "the title becomes important as a declaration by the 
Legislature of the object of the act." Proprietors of Mills v. 
Randolph, 157 Mass. 345, 350 (1892), relied upon in Wheelwright 
v. Tax Commissioner, 235 Mass. 584, 586 (1920) and further 
refined by Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 
495, 501 (1939). 
Admittedly, a broad interpretation of the citizen cause of ac-
tion as outlined above must account for language in the third 
paragraph of the statute which prescribes twenty-one days 
notice. One possible interpretation would limit the requirement 
of notice to instances of statutory or other violation of law, when 
preliminary injunctive relief is prayed for but no irreparable 
damage is threatened. In such circumstances, the Legislature 
might have concluded, written notice to an appropriate agency 
and to the Attorney General, plus a requisite twenty-one day 
dela y, is desirable. 
The breadth of the Massachusetts statute bears upon tactical 
considerations in yet another way. Under the narrower interpre-
tation private enforcement is limited to statutes, ordinances, 
by-laws, and regulations whose major purpose is to prevent or 
minimize damage to the environment. That such a purpose is only 
one of the many major purposes would be insufficient as a basis 
for suit since the citizen suit statute specifies that "the major 
purpose" is the determinant. Accordingly, since "damage to the 
environment" means damage to natural resources, statutes and 
regulations which serve primarily the public health, not pri-
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marily natural resources, may not be enforceable. Perhaps the 
State Sanitary Code is among them, and littering prohibitions 
may differ from solid waste requirements. This entire difficulty 
may be imaginary, though, because of society's recent blending 
of public health with environmental considerations. The two are 
intimately related and in many cases our environmental needs 
are directly served by our public health measures. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As of the date of this writing, notices of the first three prospec-
tive citizen suits have been received by the Attorney General. 
One is contemplated against the town of Wellesley for alleged 
air and water and wetland violations by the municipal incinera-
tor, the second against the New England Power Company for 
alleged illegal discharges from its generating facilities in Somerset 
into the Lee River, the Taunton River and Mount Hope Bay, 
and the third against the city of Worcester regarding a landfill 
dump site at Green Hill Park. 
For innumerable reasons our pollution control laws may go 
unenforced. A state or local agency might in a given case lack 
the time, personnel, or data that is required for enforcement 
action. It might, after full deliberation, find the matter at hand 
insignificant. Or it might, because of political partisanship, do 
nothing a tall. 
In no instance save the last should any agency feel embarrassed 
by subsequent citizen enforcement of the law. Citizen monitoring 
and enforcement, with ample precedent in antitrust and securities 
fraud litigation, add a healthy, fresh dimension to state and local 
abatement efforts. Society is in no position to refuse pollution 
monitoring and enforcement by so widely distributed and re-
sourceful a staff as its own citizenry. 
"+.~>.-<---.+ .. 
ApPENDIX 
CHAPTER 732. THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS IN 
THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE. 
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CAUSE OF ACTION IN BEHALF OF CER-
TAIN PERSONS AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
PROTECTING THE NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH. 
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Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in 
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same as follows 
SECTION 1. Chapter 214 of the General Laws is hereby amended 
by inserting after section 10 the following section:-
Section lOA. As used in this section, "damage to the environ-
ment" shall mean any destruction, damage or impairment, 
actual or probable, to any of the natural resources of the common-
wealth, whether caused by the respondent alone or by the 
respondent and others acting jointly or severally. Damage to the 
environment shall include, but not be limited to, air pollution, 
water pollution, improper sewage disposal, pesticide pollution, 
excessive noise, improper operation of dumping grounds, impair-
ment and eutrophication of rivers, streams, flood plains, lakes, 
ponds or other water resources, destruction of seashores, dunes, 
wetlands, open spaces, natural areas, parks or historic districts 
or sites. Damage to the environment shall not include any in-
significant destruction, damage or impairment to such natural 
resources. 
The superior court for the county in which damage to the en-
vironment is occurring or is about to occur, may, upon the peti-
tion of not less than ten persons domiciled within the common-
wealth, or upon the petition of any political subdivision of the 
commonwealth determine the issue in equity or in a petition for 
declaratory relief, and may, before the final determination of the 
cause, restrain the person causing or about to cause such damage; 
provided, however, that the damage caused or about to be caused 
by such person constitutes a violation of a statute, ordinance, 
by-law or regulation the major purpose of which is to prevent 
or minimize damage to the environment. 
No such action shall be taken unless the petitioners at least 
twenty-one days prior to the commencement of such action direct 
a written notIce of such violation or imminent violation by 
certified mail, to the agency responsible for enforcing said statute, 
ordinance, by-law or regulation, to the attorney general, and to 
the person violating or about to violate the same; provided, 
however, that if the petitioners can show that irreparable damage 
will result unless immediate action is taken the court may waive 
the foregoing requirement of notice and issue a temporary re-
straining order forthwith. 
It shall be a defense to any action taken pursuant to this sec-
tion that the respondent is subject to, and in compliance in good 
faith with, a judicially enforceable administrative pollution 
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abatement schedule or implementation plan the purpose of 
which is alleviation of damage to the environment complained 
of, unless the petitioners demonstrate that a danger to the public 
health and safety justifies the court in retaining jurisdiction. 
Any suit or action brought pursuant to the authorization con-
tained in this section shall be advanced for speedy trial and shall 
not be compromised without prior approval of the court. 
If there is a finding by the court in favor of the petitioners it 
may assess their costs, including reasonable fees of expert wit-
nesses but not attorney's fees; provided, however, that no such 
finding shall include damages. 
The court may require the petitioners to post a surety or cash 
bond in a sum not to exceed five hundred dollars to secure the 
payment of any costs which may be assessed against the peti-
tioners in the even t they do not prevail. 
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed so as to 
impair, derogate or diminish any common law or statutory right 
or remedy which may be available to any person, but the cause 
of action herein authorized shall be in addition to any such right 
or remedy. 
SECTION 2. Chapter 30A of the General Laws is hereby 
amended by inserting after section 10 the following section:-
Section lOA. Notwithstanding the provisions of section ten, not 
less than ten persons may intervene in any adjudicatory pro-
ceeding as defined in section one, in which damage to the environ-
ment as defined in section ten A of chapter two hundred and 
fourteen, is or might be at issue; provided, however, that such 
intervention shall be limited to the issue of damage to the en-
vironment and the elimination or reduction thereof in order that 
any decision in such proceeding shall include the disposition of 
such issue. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, 
any intervener under this section may introduce evidence, pre-
sent witnesses and make written or oral argument, except that 
the agency may exclude repetitive or irrelevant material. Any 
such in tervener shall be considered a party to the original pro-
ceeding for the purposes of notice and any other procedural 
rights applicable to such proceeding under the provisions of this 
chapter, including specifically the right of appeal. 
[Effective September 7,1971.] 
···>·_>e..: ___ ·." 
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